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CONGLOMERATENESS: SIZE AND
MONOPOLY CONTROL
WERNER SICHEL*
About a year ago Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, the well known economist
and "antitrust practitioner," was quoted as saying that "[t]oo little attention
has been paid to the economic aspect" of conglomerate mergers, that "[w]e
need more precise figures" and that "most of the thinking still remains to be
done."' Since that time at least eight investigations dealing with the con-
glomerate phenomenon have been undertaken.2 This volume on the
conglomerate merger and this Review's specific request for an article dealing
with the economic aspect is further evidence that Professor Edwards' initial
concern is being heeded. Unfortunately, his lament concerning "precise fig.
ures" is much more difficult to satisfy, since both the methodological prob-
lems with which we are beset and the fact that conglomerate firms present
their financial statements on a consolidated basis give us little hope for rapid
progress in this important area. In regard to Professor Edwards' third point,
we can readily agree that a great deal of thinking about the conglomerate
still needs to be done. However, much thought has recently been and is
presently being devoted to this subject. In this paper I intend to present
some of the results of this thinking - both that of my colleagues as well as
my own.
The organization will be the following: in the first section we recognize
that a great change has taken place in our economy; that large multiproduct
firms growing via interindustry acquisitions have emerged and are rapidly
increasing in number as well as in individual size. In the second section we
pose and attempt to answer some of the important questions that arise as a
consequence of this change. We are concerned with whether or not the "con-
glomerate movement" is consistent with extant antitrust philosophy, whether
the apparent concern about the conglomerate is essentially a "type of firm,"
a "size of firm," or a "monopoly control" issue, and whether it is significant
to differentiate between those conglomerates that are organized via external
growth as opposed to internal growth. In the last section we present a sum-
mary of our analysis and draw some policy conclusions.
* Associate Professor of Economics, Western Michigan University. B.S., New York
University, 1956; M.A., Northwestern University, 1960; Ph.D., Northwestern University,
1964.
1 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
2 These are being conducted by: the House Antitrust Subcommittee; the Senate Anti-
trust and Monopoly Subcommittee; the Federal Trade Commission; the Federal Com-
munications Commission; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the New York Stock
Exchange; the House Ways and Means Committee; and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.
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PART I: THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
Great changes have taken place in our economy. Only a century ago the
United States was accurately described as an agricultural country, manu-
facturing being widely dispersed in small scale plants. Economic concentra.
tion was at an extremely low level. Since that time, unprecedented techno-
logical-organizational changes have entirely altered the character of the
economy. The large corporation has become the dominant business enter-
prise and the level of economic concentration has steadily increased.
As this process evolved over the past century, there were several periods
in which particularly dramatic changes occured. These are closely associated
with the major merger waves; specifically, the period around the turn of the
century, the late 1920's, and the post-World War II period. While the latter
wave is still continuing, it has recently acquired some new features which
distinguish it from prior years; the number of mergers has vastly increased,
the size of acquired firms has grown significantly, and the change in the type
of mergers, from the horizontal and vertical types to the conglomerate, has
been momentous.
Economic concentration, the degree of inequality of control by firms,
has persistently increased since World War II. This concentration is par-
ticularly evident in the manufacturing sector, as demonstrated by Table I's
TABLE I*
SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE LARGEST
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES IN 1963 COMPARED WITH 1954 AND 1947
Percent of Value Added
Company Rank Group 1963 1954 1947
Largest 50 companies 25 23 17
Largest 100 companies 33 30 23
Largest 150 companies 37 34 27
Largest 200 companies 41 37 30
* SOURCE: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY,
1963, pt. 1, at 2 (1966) (Prepared for the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. of the Judiciary).
comparison between the years 1947, 1954, and 1963. A very substantial in-
crease in the "value added" contributed by the 50, 100,- 150 and 200
largest manufacturing firms is readily apparent. The number of large ac-
quisitions, i.e., those in which the assets of the acquired firm total at least
$10 million, has also increased. If "assets and profits" are utilized instead of
"value added," the percentages are even higher. Table II'presents the per-
centage of total assets and profits of manufacturing corporations - and there
were approximately 180,000- accounted for by eight corporate size groups
in the fourth quarter of 1962.
Similarly, the staff studies for the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability
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TABLE II
CONCENTRATION OF TOTAL MANUFACTURING ASSETS AND PROFITS BY CORPORATE
SIZE GROuPS, 4TH QUARTER, 1962
Assets Profits After Taxes
Corporate Size Group (Percent) (Percent)
5 largest 12.5 19.8
10 largest 18.7 29.6
20 largest 25.4 38.0
50 largest 36.2 47.9
100 largest 46.8 57.6
200 largest 56.8 67.5
500 largest 68.7 79.0
1000 largest 76.0 86.4
SOURCE: Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, at 113, 115 (1964)
(testimony of Williard F. Mueller).
found that the distribution of total assets of manufacturing corporations in
1968 was as follows:
The 78 corporations with assets of $1 billion or more held 43 percent
of the total, and the 529 corporations with assets of $100 million or more
held 73 percent. Another group of 791 medium-size corporations, with
assets of $25 million to $100 million held another 9 percent. The remain-
ing 18 percent of the assets was held by approximately 185,000 corpora-
tions. Although about 250,000 proprietorships and partnerships are
engaged in some form of manufacturing, their assets are less than 2 percent
of the assets of manufacturing corporations.3
It is clearly evident that this increase in the level of economic concentra-
tion has coincided with a vastly accelerating merger rate, as indicated by
Table III, which compares the number of mergers in the manufacturing and
mining sector of the economy from 1940 to 1968. Additionally, all previous
levels of merger activity were surpassed in 1968, when the Federal Trade
Commission recorded 4,003 mergers and acquisitions in all sectors of the
economy. This total represents a 68 percent increase over 1967 and a 197
percent increase over 1960.4
In addition to the increase in the number of mergers, the number of
large acquisitions - those where the assets of the acquired firm are at least
$10 million- have likewise increased. The number of large acquisitions in
manufacturing- and mining and the assets involved are presented in Table
IV for the years 1948-1968.
Indeed, it is anticipated that the approximately 50 percent increase in
assets acquired in such large mergers from 1967 to 1968 will be repeated in
1968-1969. 5 The disappearance of large firms through acquisition is further
3 STAFF OF COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, CABINET, STUIiES 45 (1969).
4 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIvITY, 1968 at 8 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as CURRENT TRENDs].
5 In a recent speech, Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Antitrust
Subcommittee, stated that "projections for 1969 indicate that $18 billion of large firm
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TABLE III
NUMBERS OF MERGERS, MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1940-1968
Year No. of Mergers* Year No. of Mergers*
1940 140 1955 683
1941 111 1956 673
1942 118 1957 585
1943 213 1958 589
1944 324 1959 835
1945 333 1960 844
1946 419 1961 954
1947 404 1962 853
1948 223 1963 861
1949 126 1964 854
1950 219 1965 1,008
1951 235 1966 995
1952 288 1967 1,496
1953 295 1968 2,442
1954 387
* This data is limited to mergers reported by Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and the
Standard & Poor's Corporation.
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICs, FTC, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY, 1968, at 8
(1969).
TABLE IV
LARGE ACQUISITIONS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING, 1948-1968
Large Acquisitions* Large Acquisitions*
Assets Assets
(millions of (millions of
Year Number dollars) Year Number dollars)
1948 6 130 1959 64 1,960
1949 5 67 1960 62 1,710
1950 4 173 1961 59 2,129
1951 9 201 1962 72 2,194
1952 13 327 1963 68 2,917
1953 23 679 1964 91 2,798
1954 35 1,425 1965 93 3,900
1955 68 2,129 1966 101 4,100
1956 58 2,037 1967 169 8,222
1957 50 1,472 1968 192 12,616
1958 38 1,107
* Acquired units with assets of $10 million or more.
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY, 1968, at 12
(1969).
evidenced by an examination of the familiar "Fortune 500."6 For example,
Representative Emanuel Celler stated that 22 percent, or 110, of Fortune's
500 list for 1962 had disappeared through merger by 1968, with 26 of these
assets will be acquired." Address by Representative Emanuel Celler, American Manage-
ment Association, Inc., June 12, 1969.
G Since 1955, Fortune magazine has annually published a list of the 500 largest
industrial firms, using sales as the determining variables. Fortune also publishes a list
of the 50 largest commercial banks, the 50 largest life insurance companies, the 50 largest
merchandising firms, the 50 largest transportation companies, the 50 largest utilities, and
the 200 largest industrials outside of the United States.
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mergers occurring in 1968.7 Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission also
makes available a list of giant firms (assets of $250 million or more) that
have disappeared through merger. While no such mergers were recorded
prior to 1958, one occurred in 1959, one in 1963, and one in 1965. More
significantly, however, 3 occurred in 1966, 6 in 1967, and 12 in 1968.8
At the beginning of this section, it was stated that not only have the
number of mergers and the size of the acquired firms increased significantly,
but that the type of merger, from the horizontal and vertical types to the
conglomerate, has also changed immensely. Table V presents, in percentage
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE MANUFACTURING AND MINING ACQUISITIONS BY TYPE OF MERGER
1948-1968
Type of 1948-53 1954-59 1960-64 1965 1966 1967 1968
Merger (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Horizontal 31 24.8 12.0 14.0 13.0 7.0 7.0
Vertical 10.3 13.7 17.0 12.0 13.0 10.0 9.0
Conglomerate 58.7 61.5 71.0 74.0 74.0 83.0 84.0
SOURCE: Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 516 (1965) (testi-
mony of Willard F. Mueller); BUREAU OF ECONOMIcs, FTC, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER
ACTIVITY, 1968, at 18 (1969).
terms, a comparison between the horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
mergers involving at least $10 million in assets occurring in the manufactur-
ing and mining sector from 1948 to 1968.
This very significant increase in conglomerate type mergers, relative to
the other two types, is complemented by an equally significant increase in
the "other" subcategory of conglomerate mergers, relative to the subcategories
of "product extension" and "market extension." 9 Table VI is illustrative of
this point; additionally, it includes the percentage of acquired assets that
each subcategory represented for the past four years.
The preceding data make it quite clear that the current level of
economic concentration is quite high, that in the manufacturing and mining
sector it has grown significantly during the past two decades, and that
mergers, and more particularly conglomerate mergers, have played both an
important and an ever increasing role in bringing about this change in the
business environment of the United States.
PART II: THE ISSUES
Data such as presented in Part I are frequently used to support the case
for a comprehensive and vigorous antitrust policy. Certain politicians, gov-
emnment agency officials, journalists, businessmen, and occasionally econo-
7 Celler, supra note 5.
s CURENT TRENDS 14.
9 The types of acquisitions will be defined and discussed in Part II of this paper.
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TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE MANUFACTURING AND MINING ACQUISITIONS BY TYPE OF
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
1948-1968
1948-53 1954-59 1960-64 1965 1965 1967 1968
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Type of Merger N6. Assets No. Assets No. Assets No. Assets
Market
extension 11.8 10.4 9.7 8.1 25.9 2.7 21.9 0 0 1.2 6.8
Product
extension 79.4 75.1 74.5 63.5 48.2 67.6 43.9 73.5 71.6 70.2 43.8
Other 8.8 14.5 15.8 27.0 25.9 31.1 34.1 26.5 29.6 28.6 48.3
Detail will in several cases not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
SoURcE: Adapted from Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 516 (1965) (testimony of Willard F. Mueller); BUREAU OF ECONoMIcs, FTC, CURRENT
TRENDS IN MERGER AcTivrrY, 1968, at 18 (1969).
mists, urgently advocate new legislation expressly prohibiting conglomerate
mergers on the basis of such data. Maybe they are right. Maybe their seem-
ingly emotional outcries have great merit and our "American system" is
suffering from a disease called superconcentration. But maybe they are
wrong. Perhaps the recent conglomerate merger wave and the ensuing higher
level of economic concentration have no harmful effect upon our economy.
The answers are not obvious, and only careful analysis of the important
issues involved will help us find the answers.
These issues should not be confused with one another for we must
separate the evaluation of the conglomerate firm from that of the giant firm,
even though there may exist an important relationship between the two.
Additionally, both must be separated from the issue of the amount of
monopoly control firms should be permitted to possess, as well as from the
issue of internal versus external growth.
Before analyzing these issues, and in order to place them into proper
context, let us briefly examine just what it is that we hope to attain through
our antitrust policy. As I have previously stated:
The raison d'etre of U.S. antitrust legislation is to promote a higher
standard of living for the American consumer. It is reasoned that this body
of law acts as an instrument for achieving this goal because it aids in
allowing the market to better perform its allocative function. The market
can only adequately fulfill this task (causing resources to flow to their most
productive use) in an atmosphere of relatively unrestrained competition.10
We believe that firms will perform better in a competitive climate; that
adequate competition will avoid persistent monopoly control profits, as
well as persistent production under conditions of excess capacity; that ade-
lOSichel, Business Reciprocity: An Unsettled Antitrust Issue, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
649, 651-52 (1968).
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quate competition will assure the consumer of a wide variety of goods and
services; and that adequate competition will stimulate a firm's research and
development program into developing new and lower-cost production meth.
ods, thereby providing the consumer with new, improved, but less expensive
products.
The term "adequate competition" is one of a number of terms em-
ployed to describe a real world competitive condition that provides de-
sirable effects. There is an abundance of literature dating back to J. M.
Clark's classic article in 194011 which attempts to describe this concept by
utilizing such labels as "workable competition," "serviceable competition,"
or "effective competition." While a single definition would probably not
satisfy all of the economists who coined these terms, it is apparent that they
do agree that such competition should not be confused with the pure or
perfect competition models of neoclassical price theory, that such com-
petition contains elements of monopoly control, and that it describes a
minimum requirement for good firm performance.
If we agree with the tenets of our antitrust philosophy, that enough
competition to assure good firm performance should be maintained, we must
determine methods to test that competition. The term "competition" is
meaningless unless related to a particular market, and it is the relevant
market that must be ascertained. We are accustomed to using "industries"
to separate our markets and seldom do we realize how very unsatisfactory
and arbitrary these boundaries are. To take an extreme position, we may
argue that there exists only a single industry -the industry of selling to
buyers. After all, buyers' incomes are finite, and they must choose among all
the goods and services offered to them. To illustrate, let us imagine an
American family that is now deciding whether to buy a piano, to in-
stall a sauna bath in their basement, or to take a two week vacation at a
Miami Beach hotel. In fact, in a nation of approximately 60 million house-
holds there may be several families confronted with a similar decision. While
the Bureau of the Census is not even tempted to place piano manufacturers,
sauna bath makers, and resort hotels in the same industry classification, all
three are competing for the dollars of the households in our illustration. We
can now reverse positions and argue just the opposite case; namely, that all
firms are monopolists; that no two firms are alike in all respects since each
sells a somewhat different product, be it the quality, the design, the package,
or merely the brand name. Furthermore, firms have different locations and
different personnel with different personalities. Thus, one can contend that
each firm is an "industry" unto itself. However, the ability to offer quite
plausible arguments for both extremes leaves us rather uncomfortable with
the "industry" concept. Maybe that concept should be abandoned. Walton
Hamilton, as quoted by Harrison Houghton, wrote:
11 Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 20 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (1940).
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[I]n a literal sense there is no such thing as industry . . . industry is
not - like frog or tree or coke oven or stock ticker - a name of something
whose identity is concrete. It evokes verbal rather than visual memories;
and a dozen artists called upon to reduce it to line and color would present
as many separate pictures. Instead it is - like truth or beauty or due process
of law or the categorical imperative - a term of the mind brought to the
world of affairs .... 12
Most economists, however, have not abandoned the "industry" concept even
though the boundaries are somewhat arbitrary, simply because it is too im-
portant a concept. Therefore, vague statements like "[c]lose, competitive sub-
stitute products, which serve as practical alternative sources of supply for
customers, are classified in the same industry"'1 will have to suffice. The Bu-
reau of the Census, on the basis of "similarity of products in terms of their
uses," "similarity of processes," and "similarity of materials used," classifies
the manufacturing sector into 20 broad "major industry groups"; then into
430 "industries," 1,000 "product classes," and 7,500 "products."'14 The Bu-
reau, referring to their classifications, states that "[i]n the great majority of
instances an industry is comprised of producers of similar goods or services"
and "that usually, but not always, the products are made of similar materials
and by similar processes and the producers usually complete [sic] with one
another."'15 By the Bureau's own admission, the Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) does not always conform to "the group of competing firms"
which we would like to identify. Furthermore, how broad or narrow an SIC
should be utilized? What is the relevant market? Economists have long relied
on the "cross-elasticity of demand" concept to determine the degree of sub-
stitutability among particular sellers' products, and thus, their industry
classification. 16 While this concept was even used by the Supreme Court in
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 17 to help determine the
relevant market, it suffers from at least two important deficiencies. First,
even if reliable price and quantity data are available, other variables will
influence the results, and second, there are other important factors, such as
quality and advertising, which must be considered.
The foregoing discussion of the term "industry" goes to the very heart
of the conglomerate issue. My purpose in explaining the imprecise nature
of industry classifications is to impress upon the reader that there is nothing
12Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 156
(1964) (testimony of Harrison Houghton quoting Walter Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as
Concentration Hearings Part 1].
13 SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 64 (1968).
14BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY pt. 1,
at XII (1963).
15 Id.
'6 Cross elasticity of demand refers to the responsiveness of the demand of one product
to a small change in the price of another product, everything else being equal. If the cross
elasticity of demand between two products is positive and high, they are good substitutes.
17 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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sacrosanct about them; that they are merely attempts to identify groups of
closely competing firms; and that they are all too often rather poor attempts.
A major reason for their imprecise nature is that classification changes do
not keep pace with the technological-organizational changes that occur in
American business. Since the activities of many of our leading corporations
range over an increasingly wide area,' 8 the modern corporation is simply
defying our old industry classifications. I believe the conglomerate merger
data in Part I might look very different if we were to abandon many of the
Bureau's industry classifications and substitute some of the following: the
energy industry, the aero-space industry, the resources industry, the com-
munications industry, the amusement or leisure-time industry, the trans-
portation industry, and the consumer-branded products industry.
What then is a conglomerate? A standard definition is that it refers to a
firm that operates in more than a single industry. But from the discussion
concerning the setting of industry boundries we realize that the definition of
a conglomerate cannot be all that precise. Just as we previously made a case
for the existence of only one industry, and then a case for as many industries
as there are firms, we could argue that no firm can be accurately described
as a conglomerate, and then again, that all firms are conglomerates. For ex-
ample, a 1968 Wall Street Journal article reported that W. T. Grimm and
Company, a Chicago financial consulting firm estimated "that 25% of the
mergers so far this year have been these so-called conglomerate marriages,
up from 15% in the first six months of 1967."'19 However, immediately
thereafter, the article pointed out that the FTC believed that "more than
80% of 1967 mergers were conglomerate." 20 When two authoritative esti-
mates range from 15 to 80 percent, the definition cannot be very precise.
The FTC classifies mergers into the three traditional categories of
horizontal, 21 vertical, 22 and conglomerate. The conglomerate category is then
divided into three subcategories: geographic market extension,23 product
18 Seven years ago, before the conglomerate issue was widely raised, Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co. was reported to be producing 27,000 different products. DUN'S
REVIEW, Aug. 1963, at 32.
19 Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1968, at I, col. 6.
20 Id.
21 "Horizontal mergers are those in which the merging companies produce one or
more closely related products in the same geographic market, for example, two fluid milk
companies in the city of Washington." Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 515 (1965) (testimony of Willard F. Mueller) [hereinafter cited as
Concentration Hearings Part 2].
22 "Vertical mergers are those in which the merging companies have a buyer-seller
relationship prior to merger, for example, an aluminum ingot manufacturer and an
aluminum product fabricator." Id.
23 "Geographic market extension mergers are those in which the acquired and acquir-
ing companies manufacture the same products, but sell them in different geographic
markets, for example, a fluid milk distributor in Washington and a fluid milk distributor
in Chicago." Id.
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extension,24 and "other" conglomerates. 25 There is little question that the
product extension variety could be eliminated by extending industry bound-
aries somewhat. Indeed, a large part of the "other" conglomerates would also
disappear as a result of changes in industry definitions. At a seminar last
year, the well-known FTC economist Harrison Houghton stated that he
realized "there is some dispute as to the use and real meaning of the term
conglomerate" and that "[a]s with many things . . . it's a question of
degree."2 6 He went on to explain that "the less a firm is dependent on any
one or a few lines of activity for its economic welfare and the longer and
wider the number of its products or its geographic markets, the more
conglomerated it is."27 While the degree of conglomerateness approach is
probably the only defensible way of dealing with the subject, it does not
satisfy many "antitrusters" who want a precise definition with which they
can associate certain characteristics. Corwin Edwards argues that the term
conglomerate can be used in either of two ways. First,
it may apply only to an enterprise that sells commodities and services
which have no functional relationship to one another-which do not
come from a common raw material, are not produced by the same equip-
ment or the same technology, are not sold through the same market
channels or to the same customers or for the same end uses, and are not
subject to the same specialized ways of doing business- such as mail-
order selling. Thus defined, conglomerate enterprises show no internal
coherence of activity or function.2S
Secondly, Edwards states that "a conglomerate enterprise may be conceived
as one that operates in a series of different markets, in each of which it en-
counters different competitors and different conditions of demand and sup-
ply and thus may be able to charge different prices and make different
profits." Thus defined, Edwards believes "a conglomerate need not be in-
ternally incoherent, [for] its strength and strategy transcend the discipline
of any particular market."29 His second definition describes conglomerates
much more broadly than does his first, since firms with substantial horizontal
24 "Product extension mergers are those in which the acquired and acquiring compa-
nies are functionally related in production and/or distribution but sell products which
do not compete directly with one another, for example, a merger between a soap manu-
facturer and a bleach manufacturer." Id.
25 "Other conglomerate mergers involve the union of two companies that do not have
any buyer-seller relationships nor are they functionally related in manufacturing or dis-
tribution, for example, a ship builder and an ice cream manufacturer." Id.
26 Houghton, The Federal Trade Commission's In-Depth Investigation of the Con-
glomerate Merger Movement, September 19, 1968, at 8 (mimeo) (statement presented before
the Seminar on New Developments in Mergers and Acquisitions, Advanced Management
Research, Inc.).
271d.
28 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 38 (testimony of Corwin Edwards).
29 Id.
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and vertical relationships among their divisions or segments are included,
whereas they were not in the first.
Hopefully, our brief discussion of the various approaches in defining
a conglomerate and the difficulties involved with each of them has prepared
us for the uneasy task of evaluating something we cannot be quite sure we
have satisfactorally defined. Next, we must inquire whether the conglom-
erate firm possesses any special characteristics which make it incompatible
with our present antitrust philosophy. If we use Edwards' first definition,
in which there is virtually no economic relationship among the various ac-
tivities it performs in different markets, the conglomerate firm is quite com-
patible with our antitrust philosophy. Conglomerateness per se does not
impede competition. As Morris Adelman has stated, "[t]he fact is that a
truly conglomerate merger cannot be attacked in order to maintain com-
petition, because it has no effect on any market structure."30 Concurring in
this statement is Jesse Markham who has stated:
The argument goes that the conglomerate firm, simply by virtue of the
fact that it actively engages in producing and selling in two or more rea-
sonably distinct markets, somehow acquires a special advantage over its
single-product competition in each. . . . It is . . . discretionary power
over the market unchecked effectively by the market forces, and not
"conglomerateness" 
. . . that makes possible the anticompetitive tactics
often erroneously assigned to the large multi-product firm as such.31
Even Edwards, who clearly adopts his second definition in his attempt to
analyze the conglomerate, states that "[t]he mere fact that diversified goods
are sold by a single enterprise is not, of itself, ground for concern."32 If we
conclude that conglomerateness per se has a neutral effect on competition,
we must then determine how important that finding is. After all, we must
reconcile this conclusion with the numerous and mounting attacks on the
conglomerate in American business. If, indeed, only conglomerate firms pos-
sessing additional, special features bring about anticompetitive effects, per-
haps we should be more concerned with these special features and less
concerned with their conglomerateness.
Before making this important decision, we must identify the special
features and ascertain whether conglomerates in the real world always have
them. These special features are large size and monopoly control. While all
conglomerate firms cannot be described as very large firms, they all possess
some degree of monopoly control in the various markets in which they
30 Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-1960, 51 AM. EcoN. REv. 236, 243 (1961).
31 Concentration Hearings Part 3 at 1270-71 (testimony of Jesse Markham).
32 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 38 (testimony of Corwin Edwards). It is interesting
to note that Dr. Edwards omits the term "conglomerate" when there is no "ground for
concern." A recent Wall Street Journal article quoted "the head of a West Coast company
that most people call a conglomerate" as saying: "Call me an SOB. Tell people I beat MY
kids. But please don't call me a conglomerate." Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1969, at 1,
col. 40.
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operate.8 8 These two characteristics are very different and must be treated
separately. Large size is a superconcentration concept which may or may
not affect competition in particular markets. Large size, however, doesn't
automatically provide a firm with sufficient market power to escape the
discipline of competition; and significant market power may be held by
firms which are not large. This contention is validated by Jesse Markham's
statement that "[m]arket power and bigness are simply like obesity and
pregnancy - different conditions requiring different remedies."3 4 For il-
lustrative purposes let us examine two alternative hypothetical situations,
each involving the hundred largest firms in the nation. In the first case the
hundred largest firms are in a hundred different industries, so that each
one is the leading firm in a different industry, accounting for 40 percent or
more of the sales of that industry. In the second case, the firms are much
less specialized, each serving so many markets that no firm accounts for
more than 5 percent of the sales of any one industry. From this information
we would confidently predict that the firms in the first case possess much
more monopoly control as a result of their larger market shares than do
the firms in the second case, even though firm size was the same in each.
Analogous to our argument that conglomerateness per se does not
impede competition is the contention that large size per se does not impede
competition either. Conglomerateness and large size, alone or together, are
not sufficient to infer anticompetitive effects; a third ingredient is neces-
sary - a substantial degree of monopoly control. This third ingredient is
both necessary and sufficient, although conglomerateness and large size may
play an important role in allowing a firm to use it more effectively (to the
greater detriment of society). A large conglomerate firm possessing sub-
stantial monopoly control in market A may find it advantageous to tem-
porarily use some of its monopoly profits in market B in order to enhance
its monopoly control there and increase its total long-run profits. It is the
necessary condition of monopoly control in this example, not conglomerate-
ness and/or large size, that is incompatible with our antitrust philosophy.
The following testimony by Walter Adams and Corwin Edwards before the
Senate committee investigating economic concentration seems to argue quite
the opposite and I contend that their emphasis is misplaced:
A firm possesses conglomerate power when its operations are so widely
diversified that its survival no longer depends on success in any given
product market or any given geographical area. Its absolute size, its sheer
bigness, is so impressive that it can discipline or destroy its more specialized
competitors.
A conglomerate giant is powerful, therefore, not because it has mo-
nopoly or oligopoly control over a particular market, but because its re-
33Virtually all firms face a negatively sloped demand curve. Even where product
differentiation is slight, locational differences unimportant, and the seller's role a minor
one, some consumer acceptance, and therefore monopoly control takes place.
34Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
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sources are bigger than those of its specialized competitors, and because
these resources are diversified over many different markets.35
A big firm has advantages over a smaller rival just because it is big.
Money is power. A big firm can outbid, outspend, and outlose a small
firm. It can advertise more intensively, do more intensive and extensive
research, buy up the inventions of others, defend its legal rights or al-
leged rights more thoroughly, bid higher for scarce resources, acquire the
best locations and the best technicians and executives. If it overdoes its
expenditures, it can absorb losses that would bankrupt a small rival....
[S]o far as diversification increases the possibility for some firms to
become big relative to others, it increases the possibility that they will
obtain such advantages. The power that is derived from dispersion of re-
sources is peculiar to conglomerate enterprise....
Because a large conglomerate operates in many markets, it can
divert income from one market to another. It can subsidize its losses in
one market from its profits in another, or make investments in production
for one market with resources derived from another. This fact gives a con-
glomerate exceptional leeway in market policy and exceptional possibility
of imposing its will upon its more specialized rivals.3 6
While Adams explicitly explains that conglomerate power stems from
large size and conglomerateness rather than from monopoly control, Ed-
wards does so implicitly by basing his argument on the former two and
omitting the latter. This is obviously contrary to our attempted analysis of
the problem.
Another important economic consideration is that the large conglom-
erate firm may enjoy important advantages over its more specialized com-
petitors in particular markets as a result of horizontal or vertical relation-
ships among the various markets in which they operate. This relates to the
previous discussions of the imprecise nature of industries, and therefore,
conglomerates. We have accepted the degree of conglomerateness approach
and are now ready to explain its relationship to monopoly control. The
smaller the degree of conglomerateness or the greater the horizontal and/or
vertical relationships among the different discernible markets in which a
firm operates, the greater its monopoly control in these markets.
A very helpful concept which can be utilized to express and even
transcend the usual interpretation of the "degree of conglomerateness" has
been introduced by John Narver. Narver explains that each firm may be
thought of as a "collection of component resources and activities" which
center around certain "organization - activity nodes."37 The degree of "node
commonality" that is present among the various divisions or segments of a
conglomerate firm is an indication of how much monopoly control may be
gained in any one market from the entire operation of the firm. The essen-
tial difference between the "node commonality" concept and what is usually
35 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 249 (testimony of Walter Adams).
36 Id. at 42-43 (testimony of Corwin Edwards).
37 NARvER, CONGLOMERATE MsERaS AND MAxr COMPmTON 3-6 (1967).
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understood as the conglomerateness concept is that the latter refers to
particular industry classifications, while the former refers to the organiza
tional relationship within the entire firm. A firm may operate in different
industries in which it sells quite different products (neither close substitutes
nor good complements) and yet experience substantial production node
commonality. It may also experience varying degrees of node commonality
in management, promotion, distribution, and research and development.
Where node commonality is high, the resulting economies, which are not
enjoyed by the conglomerate's specialized competitors, add to the conglom-
erate's monopoly control.
It is important to understand that our analysis here points to a con-
clusion which is completely contrary to the common belief that "conglom-
erateness provides a special advantage." Since the greater the degree of
conglomerateness or the lower the node commonality, the less monopoly
control will be enjoyed by a conglomerate firm in each market in which it
operates, it is the lack of conglomerateness that enables it to achieve a high
degree of monopoly control.
In order to predict the competitive effect of a firm's conglomerate
growth, it is essential to examine its impact, in terms of monopoly control,
upon the firms competing in markets in which it is already involved and
in those into which it is contemplating entry. Since conglomerate expansion
competes with horizontal or vertical expansion for limited corporate
funds, it is reasonable to expect that the increases in the latter mar-
kets may be offset by the lack of increase in the former markets. Pre-
sumably, the corporate decision will be made on the basis of the highest
expected return on invested capital, adjusted for the element of risk. This
provides a much better resource allocation than if corporations were limited
to investment in their more narrowly defined market area. A Penn-Central
executive asks: "Why put money into the railroad where the return is 3%
when we can invest in things making 15% or 207o?"8 Conglomerate growth
thus performs the useful function of aiding the flow of investment funds
into the newer industries, which are often characterized by high concentra-
tion levels. We can therefore expect a decrease in the degree of monopoly
control held by the established firms in these industries.89 Furthermore, the
industries need not be very new. The President of Litton Industries, for ex-
ample, "points to the U.S. market for cash registers, which for many years
has been dominated by National Cash Register Co. (NCR)."40 Litton ac-
quired a foreign manufacturer, Sugnska Dataregista (Sweda), which, explains
Mr. Ash, "gave it the financial muscle to become the first real competition
for NCR." Without the kind of resources that enables it to open 400 service
38 Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
39 Data in support of this thesis are presented by Michael Gort in Concentration
Hearings Part 2 at 676-77.
40Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1968, at 13, col. 1.
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centers and develop new products, "Sweda would never have made it on its
own." In addition, Mr. Ash told of Litton's acquisition of Profexray Inc.,
and how it was boosted by Litton "to an important place in the market
for X-ray equipment, challenging General Electric, Picker X-Ray Corpora-
tion and Westinghouse, which had long dominated the field."
41
A freqently raised issue in recent years has been the alleged advantage
accruing to conglomerates through their use of reciprocal agreements. Ed-
wards lists "reciprocity" as an important aspect of the power that is derived
from the dispersion of resources by conglomerate firms. He claims that
"[r]eciprocal buying appears to be common among conglomerates. As a
diversified enterprise, a large conglomerate buys a large and varied assort-
ment of goods and services. These purchases can be used as leverage in
making sales." 42 In addition, Willard Mueller employs the findings of two
case studies48 to argue that "the vertical relationships of a large conglom-
erate enterprise may result in competitive strategies which threaten com-
petition .... Although reciprocal selling is not a new business strategy, the
opportunity for its exercise has increased in recent years as firms have be-
come increasingly conglomerated." 44 Economic theory, however, does not
support the validity of such analysis. Once again, it is monopoly control and
not conglomeration per se that allows anticompetitive reciprocal agreements
to occur. Monopoly control can be used directly by charging higher prices,
just as monopsony control can be used directly by extracting lower input
prices. Reciprocal agreements are merely a form in which they can take
place. Without market power, firms can neither charge higher prices nor
extract lower prices. James Ferguson, in an article in which he presents an
economic analysis of reciprocity, writes:
[I]n the absence of market power, reciprocity, at best, can secure sales for
the firm at equal prices. Competitors are foreclosed from sales at equal
prices, but this fact is of little consequence since all firms can practice
reciprocity; there will be many such agreements among mutual suppliers.
In the absence of power to enforce the agreement in the presence of lower
prices offered by other sellers, these agreements will not lessen competi-
tion .... 45
We may conclude that while conglomerateness per se does not cause any
anticompetitive effects as a result of reciprocal agreements, conglomerate
firms have more opportunity to make such agreements, and if they possess
41 Id.
42 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 44 (testimony of Corwin Edwards).
43 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); In re Consolidated Foods
Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,403 (FTC 1965).
44Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 5, at 1873
(1966) (testimony of Willard F. Mueller).
45 Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAW &
CoNrEMP. PROB. 570 (1965).
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substantial monopoly control, may find this a convenient form to exploit
their position.
Thus far this section has dealt only with the economics of the conglom-
erate firm, and we have attempted to avoid the question of the conglomerate
merger. We have concluded that conglomerateness per se does not lead to
anticompetitive effects and that monopoly control is the root cause of such
effects. We have also pointed out, however, that all firms have some degree
of monopoly control, and that limiting it to low levels in order to maintain
(or attain) viable competition in each group of competing firms is con-
sistent with our antitrust philosophy. Therefore, the form in which conglom-
erate growth takes place may be very important. One way may be more
conducive to monopoly control than another.
Conglomerate growth may be internal or external. Richard Heflebower
has concerned himself with the basic differences between these two concepts.
In 1951, before the conglomerate merger issue emerged, he wrote:
Where expansion is by building, the firm grows in the face of competition.
It meets and passes market tests....
[A] corporation which grows by merger has not by that fact proved
its greater ability in an open contest with rivals. It may be more efficient,
but it has not demonstrated that in the impersonal processes of the
market. Instead by one stroke a going concern is acquired and its share
of the market obtained at least temporarily .... [W]e can say that in and
of itself growth by merger is not evidence of competitive success.46
Fourteen years later Heflebower added:
When an enterprise expands in its primary market, or enters a new
one, by building, it has made a decision in light of market prospects. These
are the prospective level of input prices, and of demand for the product,
often in a specific geographic area, and the share of the market the firm
expects to obtain. Prospective process and product changes have been esti-
mated. Equally important are conclusions about future alternative needs
for funds in the enterprise's present operations or for other opportunities
that may arise.. . . If the funds have to be got by borrowing or sale of
stock, the judgement of bankers or investors is superimposed on that of
the corporation's management.... If it enters another line by the building
method, it disturbs the status quo in that market.
Much of the process just sketched is minimized or sidestepped if ex-
pansion is by merger. The acquired firm is a going organization (the failing
firm case is excluded here) with installed equipment and established input
and product market connections. . . . In a large portion of cases the
merger is consummated by an exchange of stock and by vote of the direc-
tors. The acquiring firm does not need to use its cash nor to meet the
external test of bankers or of buyers of an additional issue of stock.47
It does not follow from Heflebower's line of reasoning that external
conglomerate growth will always bring about socially undesirable effects. In
46 Heflebower, Economics of Size, 24 J. Bus. 253, 255-56 (1951).
47 Concentration Hearings Part 2 at 793 (testimony of Richard B. Heflebower).
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fact, it is important to remember that there are three alternatives - internal
conglomerate growth, external conglomerate growth, and no conglomerate
growth - and that if external conglomerate growth is blocked, no conglom-
erate growth (which may mean more horizontal or vertical growth) may
be preferred to internal conglomerate growth.48 However, where the internal
growth alternative is considered workable, we would agree with Heflebower
that external growth does circumvent important market tests, and that
everything else being equal, we would prefer internal growth that is sub-
jected to these tests.
In those instances where the internal growth alternative can be used to
accomplish a conglomerate growth objective, new and additional com-
petition takes place. This is not the case when growth is by merger. Initially,
only the source of control is altered, with capacity remaining the same. More
precisely, internal growth brings about entry whereas external growth does
not.49 In the absence of any specific information about a particular case, we
can confidently predict that an additional competitor with additional pro-
duction capacity in the industry will provide at least as positive an affect on
competition as would be the case if this firm had entered via merger. The
facts of the case, including the competitive nature of the industry, the node
commonality existing between the firm's primary activity and this one, and
the market share that it would obtain, must be ascertained before one can
adequately predict whether more, less, or no change in competition within
the industry will result.
When internal growth can reasonably be expected, and the industry
in question has fairly high entry barriers, conglomerate merger does have
anticompetitive effects since it eliminates a potential entrant. It terminates
the possibility that a likely entrant via internal growth (the acquiring firm)
will be added to the number of competitors in the market of the acquired
firm and, vice-versa, it eliminates a firm whose pattern of internal growth
might very well have brought it into the market of the acquirer. This
"potential entrant" point should not be confused with an acquirer's com-
petitive effect on the industry stemming from the degree of monopoly con-
trol that it can derive. This distinction becomes more apparent from a brief
examination of the issues dealt with in two recent antitrust cases.
The first is United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,50 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1964. In 1956 El Paso Natural Gas supplied more than
48 In the case of Litton Industries, discussed above, it is entirely possible that if its
acquisition of Sweda had been blocked, it would not have internally entered the cash
register business, and that the viable competition it offers to National Cash Register Co.
would not be occurring.
49 Joe S. Bain, who has dealt with the concept of entry more than and better than
any other economist, has defined entry as "an addition to industry capacity already in use
plus emergence of a firm new to the industry .. J. BAIN, BArnMES To NEw CoMsErMON
5 (1956).
50 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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half of California's natural gas. On the other hand, the Pacific Northwest
Pipeline sold no gas in California, but had shown itself to be a likely poten-
tial entrant since on several occasions it had attempted to make contracts
to sell gas in California. The Supreme Court held that acquisition of Pacific
Northwest by El Paso "substantially lessened competition" and therefore,
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950.51 In the second
case, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,52 the Supreme Court again ruled that
an acquisition "substantially lessened competition" and therefore violated
the law, but this time primarily because of the added monopoly control that
it gave to the firm in the acquired's market. Procter & Gamble, a large soap
products firm, had acquired Clorox Chemical Company, the largest house-
hold laundry bleach firm. It was apparent that Procter & Gamble had no in-
tention of internally growing into the bleach market, and that the Court's
decision resulted primarily because of significant promotional economies en-
suing from the merger that could not be matched by other bleach firms. In
contrast to the El Paso case, Procter & Gamble's potential entry status was
not emphasized. Instead, the gain in the degree of monopoly control that
was derived through the merger of two firms with strong promotional node
commonality was given primary attention.53
Our analysis very clearly suggests that competition will either be af-
fected in the same way or be enhanced by internal conglomerate growth as
opposed to external. Table VII presents some data which indicates that
external growth is, however, becoming relatively more prevalent. This data
includes only assets of manufacturing and mining firms with assets of $10
million or more, and encompasses all types of mergers. Nevertheless, since
the FTC classifies 89 percent of the assets (in 1968) involved in "large"
acquisitions as conglomerate, the "assets of large acquisitions as a percent of
new investment" data provides us with a fairly good indication of the
relative importance of external growth.
PART III: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The data presented in Part I illustrates that concentration in the manu-
facturing sector has increased over the past two decades, and that a record
number of mergers, predominantly conglomerate mergers, have been con-
summated in recent years. Politicians, economists, and others who suggest
stern antitrust action on the basis of this data implicitly equate increases in
5142 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, ch. 1184, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950).
52 586 U.S. 568 (1967).
53 The effect that merger may have on entry is expressed in yet another way. Not
only is a likely potential entrant eliminated when it chooses the merger route, but if
strong node commonality exists, the merger will add to the firm's monopoly control in
the industry. This will, in turn, raise the industry's entry barriers. In the Procter & Gamble
case, where there was evidence of strong promotional node commonality, it was argued
that the promotional economies that Procter & Gamble's division was able to enjoy made it
substantially less attractive to enter the household laundry bleach industry.
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TABLE VII
ASSETS OF LARGEl ACQUISITIONS COMPARED WITH NEW INVESTMENT,
MANUFACTURING AND MINING,
1948-1968
New Investment
(Billions of dollars)
10.01
7.94
8.20
11.78
12.61
12.90
12.02
12.40
16.19
17.20
12.37
15.06
15A7
14.66
15.76
16.73
19.77
25.75
28.46
28.11
28.27
Assets of Large
Acquisitions
(Billions of dollars)
.130
.067
.173
.201
.327
.679
1A25
2.129
2.037
1.472
1.107
1.960
1.710
2.129
2.194
2.917
2.798
3.900
4.100
8.222
12.616
Acquired Assets as
Percent of New
Investment
1.3
0.8
2.1
1.7
2.6
5.3
11.9
17.2
12.6
8.6
8.9
15.0
11.1
14.5
13.9
17A
14.2
16.4
14.4
29.2
44.6
1 Assets of $10 million or more.
2 Figures for 1968 are preliminary.
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY, 1968, at 17
(1969).
concentration levels in the manufacturing sector with decreases in com-
petition in American industry. This is a roaring non sequitur. Competition
can only be adequately dealt with in the context of a relevant market; and,
how the relevant market is defined (the industry, the group of competing
firms) determines the level of concentration. Likewise, the level of concentra-
tion may not be equated with the inverse of the level of competition. Except
for some extreme cases that approach either monopoly or monopolistic com-
petition,54 the examination should not be restricted to the absolute level of
concentration. Some other determinants of competition that should be ex-
amined are relative concentration, rank mobility among the largest firms,
product differentiation, the state of potential entry, and the degree of vertical
integration.
The imprecise nature of the industry or the market with which we must
deal in order to make judgments concerning the adequacy of competition,
acts as a major obstacle to attaining reliable results. Since a conglomerate is
54 The term monopolistic competition is used here as it was described in Chamber-
lin's large numbers case. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
(1933).
Year
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
19682
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a firm that operates in more than one industry, all of the difficulties that I1
confront us when we try to define a particular industry are present and
multiplied when we attempt to determine whether a particular firm is all
conglomerate. Recognizing that a pure conglomerate does not exist in the
real world because there is always some economic relationship between the
markets that we do identify, we have adopted a "degree of conglomerate-
ness" concept. The degree of conglomerateness is inversely related to the
node commonality or the degree of horizontal and/or vertical aspects among
the identified markets.
In order to deal with the competitive consequences of the conglomerate
or what is sometimes referred to as "conglomerate power," we suggested
that the factors of conglomerateness, large size, and monopoly control that
are associated with the conglomerate should be examined separately. We
concluded that conglomerateness per se (the pure conglomerate) does not
affect competition, that large size per se (superconcentration) does not affect
competition, and that monopoly control is the determining factor. We recog-
nized that the degree of conglomerateness could have important effects
upon the degree of monopoly control that is obtained in a particular market,
and that as a general rule, the lower the degree of conglomerateness, or the
greater the horizontal and/or vertical relationships among the different dis-
cernible markets in which a firm operates, the greater will be its monopoly
control in those markets. Of course, the degree of monopoly control that a
firm enjoys is based upon its relative position within the group of competing
firms. Therefore, if all the major firms are equally conglomerate (which
indicates that we defined the industry poorly), and very low entry barriers
exist, the competitive advantage of the conglomerate firm would be slight
compared to the situation in which it competes with specialized firms and
where entry barriers are high. Singling out conglomerateness as we have done
allows us to see more clearly that conglomerateness provides no special ad-
vantage to firms, and that the concern about "conglomerate power," which
is often expressed in terms of firms being too conglomerate, should be shifted
to a concern about "monopoly power." Thus, our concern should be ex-
pressed in terms of firms not being conglomerate enough.
The market mechanism is largely relied upon in the United States to
attain the best possible allocation of our scarce resources. This is a basic
principle of economics that has long been expounded by the economics
profession. Consistent with this theory, investment funds should be per-
mitted to flow freely in order to attain the highest returns commensurate
with risk. Resources shifting from low return to high return occupations
will erode monopoly returns, while increasing returns in the areas from
which they were withdrawn. Conglomerate growth should therefore be fos-
tered. Conglomerate growth into markets served by firms possessing substan-
tial monopoly control may be a positive competitive force even if the con-
glomerate has certain node commonality advantages.
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We concluded that conglomerate growth may have positive, negative,
or neutral effects on competition in particular markets, depending upon the
state of actual and potential competition in the industries involved, and
the node commonality that is present. But that still left us with the very
important consideration of what form this conglomerate growth should be
encouraged to take. On the basis that internal growth must pass certain
market tests which are often circumvented by external growth, and that
internal growth means an additional competitor in the industry, whereas
external growth does not, we stated a definite preference for internal con-
glomerate growth. It does not follow, however, that a blanket rule blocking
external conglomerate growth should be adopted. Denying conglomerate
merger may achieve a less desirable result than permitting it. A firm wishing
to enter a market via acquisition may not wish to do so in any other way.
Therefore, the choice is not necessarily limited to whether, from society's
point of view, internal conglomerate growth is preferable to external con-
glomerate growth, but may be expanded to include the question of whether
external conglomerate growth is preferable to no conglomerate growth.
Furthermore, if the firm elects no conglomerate growth, it may elect more
vertical and/or horizontal growth, which may have greater anticompetitive
consequences than the external conglomerate growth that was inhibited.
The analysis in this paper leads us to certain conclusions and policy
suggestions. First, we should understand that our antitrust philosophy is
based upon the recognition that adequate competition is essential if we
wish to depend upon the market mechanism to play the major role in re-
source allocation. Conglomerate growth must be examined, and either
condoned or condemned on the basis of its effects on competition in the
relevant markets. No general rule can be applied, as conglomerate growth
may enhance competition in one instance and substantially lessen it in an-
other. Very important differences in the degree of conglomerateness as wel
as the competitive environment of the relevant markets are responsible for
these variations. Our analysis does indicate that the more conglomerate a
firm is, the less likely it is to adversely affect competition in the markets in
which it operates.
In order to determine the difference between the competitive con-
sequences of internal versus external conglomerate growth, the most im-
portant information to have is the likelihood that internal growth will take
place if external growth is denied. If internal growth can be reasonably
expected and the market is characterized by fairly high entry barriers, the
potential entrant should be prohibited from acquiring any but a failing firm
in the industry.
Policy makers should focus their attention not upon the "evils of con-
glomerateness," but, instead, upon the "evils of monopoly control." The
term conglomerate is presently being used in conjunction with rather nar-
rowly defined markets. If new and broader industry classifications reflect-
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ing the great number of technological-organizational changes that have
occurred in our economy, are devised, many firms that possess substan-
tial node commonality between their various divisions or segments, and
which, through their activities, possess a substantial degree of monopoly
control, would be eliminated from the ranks of the conglomerates. When
high degrees of production node commonality exist between divisions or
segments of what are now considered conglomerates, so that they obtain
substantial advantages over their more specialized competitors, it should be
interpreted as indicating that the present industry classifications are in-
adequate and that a broader definition should be introduced (or already
has been by the market). The specialized firms which find themselves at a
competitive disadvantage are consequently compelled to either grow to
include the necessary operations or to cease to exist. Government policy
should actively foster their growth by either internal or external means so
that they can become viable competitors in their industry. In this way the
degree of monopoly control held by individual firms in the industry can
be minimized.
Since the antitrust laws in the United States are aimed at combating
monopoly control, the root-cause of anticompetitive effects, it seems inad-
visable to add new legislation against conglomerates which,. in the absence
of substantial monopoly control, have no adverse competitive effects. What
is needed is more viable enforcement of present antitrust laws.
